Pollution and Protest in China by Fiori, Antonio
The China Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY
Additional services for The China Quarterly:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Pollution and Protest in China: Environmental 
Mobilization in Context
Yanhua Deng and Guobin Yang
The China Quarterly / Volume 214 / June 2013, pp 321 ­ 336
DOI: 10.1017/S0305741013000659, Published online: 25 June 2013
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741013000659
How to cite this article:
Yanhua Deng and Guobin Yang (2013). Pollution and Protest in China: 
Environmental Mobilization in Context. The China Quarterly, 214, pp 321­336 
doi:10.1017/S0305741013000659
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY, IP address: 165.123.34.86 on 26 Jun 2013
Pollution and Protest in China:
Environmental Mobilization in Context*
Yanhua Deng† and Guobin Yang‡
Abstract
This article focuses on environmental controversy in a Chinese rural com-
munity. It shows that Chinese villagers may protest against anticipated pol-
lution if the environmental threat is effectively framed. In the face of real
and serious pollution, villagers may seek to redress environmental grievances
by piggybacking on politically favourable issues. However, when the pol-
lution is caused by fellow villagers, environmentally concerned villagers
may remain silent owing to the constraints of community relations and econ-
omic dependency. These findings suggest that the relationship between pol-
lution and protest is context-dependent.
Keywords: framing; issue piggybacking; political opportunity; community
relations; economic dependency; China
In 2005, farmers in Huaxi画溪,1 Zhejiang province, forced 11 polluting factories
off their land.2 Initially, they had challenged the potential polluters in antici-
pation of future pollution problems. Later, when the polluting factories moved
to their community and began to cause the expected damage, the villagers con-
tinued to protest, but strangely their claims were mainly land-related rather
than environmental. In contrast, Huaxi has long had a cottage industry of recy-
cling plastic waste, which was a major source of pollution, yet the villagers had
never staged a protest. These puzzling phenomena raise questions about the
relationship between pollution and protest. Why did Huaxi villagers protest
against anticipated pollution? Later, why did the aggrieved villagers mainly
* The authors thank Anna Lora-Wainwright and Jennifer Holdaway for their helpful comments.
Generous financial support was provided to the first author by the China National Social Sciences
Foundation (project code 12CSH041) and the American Social Science Research Council’s grant for
collaborative research on environmnet and health in China.
† Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu. Email: deng1999@gmail.com (corre-
sponding author).
‡ University of Pennsylvania. Email: gyang@asc.upenn.edu.
1 Huaxi formerly had been a town in Dongyang county, Jinhua city, Zhejiang province. In October 2004,
it was merged with its neighbour, Huangtianfan, and became a part of the new town of Huashui. Huaxi
is also the name of a village consisting of six sub-villages. Huaxi No. 5 village was the main force of the
environmental struggle examined here, but most villagers in the former Huaxi town also participated.
2 For media reports on the Huaxi environmental contention, see Song 2005; Markus 2005; Watts 2005.
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focus on land-related claims? Finally, what explains the silence of the villagers in
the face of pollution produced by their own plastic waste recycling businesses?
Many studies have demonstrated that the relationship between pollution and pro-
test is not linear. Serious pollution does not necessarily motivate protest whereas pro-
test may occur without any real pollution. In some NIMBY protests in developed
countries, affected communities have often taken action against proposed polluting
facilities.3 In China, the Xiamen “PX Incident,”4 the Guangdong “Anti-Nansha
Petrochemical Project,”5 and the protest against a waste project in Qidong启东6 all
show thatChinese citizens are also becoming increasingly environmentally concerned
and may organize protests against anticipated pollution. However, these examples
have mostly occurred in urban areas.7 According to media reports, Chinese villagers
almost invariably turn intoviolent insurgentswhenpollution takesa tollonhealthand
threatens livelihoods.8 The first episode of protest examined here, however, is a case
about Chinese villagers protesting against anticipated pollution.
A frequently discussed factor mediating the relationship between pollution and
protest is framing.9 The literature on framing shows that the same phenomenon
may be viewed in different ways by different people.10 For example, an illness
linked to environmental pollution may be viewed as a matter of individual
hygiene, or it may be framed as an outcome of environmental pollution.11 The
interlocking of issues, such as environmental pollution and illegal land requisi-
tions, produces even more leeway for framing. For example, in environmental
contention, protesters aggrieved by pollution may piggyback on issues unrelated
to pollution, thereby allowing more opportunities to maximize the vulnerability
of their opponents.12 Protests aiming to redress environmental grievances do
not necessarily proceed with environmental claims.
Economic dependency complicates the relationship between pollution and
protest.13 As Gould rightly points out, “what is the ‘stench of pollution’ to an
outsider may be ‘the sweet smell of money’ to local residents.” “Economic black-
mail,” for instance threats of unemployment or economic decline, can smother
any potential environmental protest in dependent communities.14 Furthermore,
3 Boudet 2011; Thornton and Tizard 2010; van der Horst 2007.
4 Xie 2007.
5 Huang 2009.
6 Perlez 2012.
7 Wasserstrom 2009; Johnson 2010.
8 For such media reports, see Qi 2011; Dou 2009; Cui 2009.
9 For discussions and critiques of the concept of framing in the study of social movements, see Benford
1997; Benford and Snow 2000.
10 Shmueli et al. 2006; Vaughan and Seifert 1992.
11 For example, Lora-Wainwright 2010.
12 Ungar argues that environmental claims are more likely to be honoured when they “piggyback on dra-
matic real-world events” because such dramatic events bring attention to issues that are otherwise neg-
lected. See Ungar 1992. Other studies have shown that frames which tap into a hegemonic discourse or
are consistent with the opportunity structure tend to be more politically effective. See Koopmans and
Statham 1999; Diani 1996.
13 See van Rooij 2010; Lora-Wainwright 2010; Tilt 2006; Gould 1991.
14 Gould 1991.
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efforts by polluting corporations, for example the provision of alternative sources
of water, may deflect criticism and impede protest mobilization.15 Even though
economic dependency can account for the silence of dependent residents, it can-
not adequately explain why independent residents in some communities do not
engage in challenging actions.
In our study, we found that villagers may protest against anticipated pollution
if the environmental threat is effectively framed. In the face of real and serious
pollution, they may seek to redress environmental grievances by piggybacking
on politically favourable issues. However, the same villagers may remain silent
about serious pollution caused by fellow villagers owing to the constraints of
community relations and economic dependency. These findings suggest that
the relationship between pollution and protest is context-dependent.
This article draws on both interviews and archives. The first author conducted
semi-structured interviews with 122 informants from early April to late July 2007.
The interviewees included protest leaders, village cadres, township cadres,
municipal officials and ordinary villagers. Owing to the sensitivity of the topic,
the interviewees were selected in a snowball fashion. With exceptionally good
access to both local officials and protesters, it was also possible to collect archival
materials, including petition letters, leaflets and posters penned by villagers, work
diaries and reports written by local officials, official regulations, meeting records,
and an internal Daily Report (Meiri yibao 每日一报) that meticulously traced
what happened each day.
The Perceived Threat of Anticipated Pollution
In October 2001, local authorities began construction of a chemical park in
Huaxi. Dongnong 东农 Company, a notorious pesticide factory, was to be relo-
cated to this park. The Party secretary of Huaxi No. 5 village opposed this move
and attempted to stop it. He consulted an expert, investigated the polluted village
where the company was then located, and penned a leaflet entitled “A portrait of
Dongnong Company” (hereafter referred to as “The portrait”). The Party sec-
retary anonymously sent about 150 copies of the leaflet to influential Huaxi vil-
lagers. It was received on about 17 October, and a protest was staged primarily
during the following three days.
“The portrait” framed the environmental threat from Dongnong Company in
a way that resonated with Huaxi villagers’ cultural values about lineage and off-
spring. The emphasis was on the potential destruction of their lineage because the
pollution might harm the “quality” of their descendants.16 First, it depicted the
frightening scenario in the village of Luzhai 陆宅 which had already been pol-
luted by the company:
15 Solecki 1996; Gould 1993.
16 This is reminiscent of Jing’s argument about how local cultural values suffuse rural environmental pro-
test. See Jing 2000.
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Waste water and gas discharged from the former Dongnong Company have been damaging the
environment for miles around. Underground water is not drinkable in the vicinity of the pollu-
ter. People inhaling poisonous gas easily catch respiratory and liver illnesses. Crop and fruit
yields have been seriously depressed, sometimes without any harvest. Villagers dare not eat
what they grow on the land. All kinds of fish have died in the river into which the
waste water flows. The land around is desolated. Carcinogenic substances from heaps of chemi-
cal waste at the Luzhai factory site have seeped into the land so deeply that the adverse effects
will not be eliminated even after hundreds of years. The pollution has endangered the survival of
the offspring of Lu 卢, the most prestigious lineage in Dongyang 东阳.17
“The portrait” continued by listing the products manufactured by Dongnong
Company as well as seven dire consequences if the factory were to move to
Huaxi. The first two consequences were described as follows:
(1) Villagers’ health conditions will deteriorate. With lowered immunity, we might catch all
sorts of diseases, and this will increase our medical expenses.
(2) The quality (sushi 素质) of our descendants will be lowered. The mortality and deformity
rates of newborn babies will increase. More children will be born with mental retardation
and even more will fail to be admitted into colleges or the army.
“The portrait” used powerful rhetoric. It enumerated the previous protests
against the company, noting that the provincial governor had issued an order
to shut down the factory. It warned villagers that a gas bomb might land in
Huaxi. “The portrait” concluded with a call to arms to Huaxi villagers: “It is bet-
ter to die fighting today than to be killed by poison tomorrow!”
The environmental threat described in “The portrait” caused panic and gener-
ated a sense of injustice among the villagers for three reasons. First, the villagers
were able to confirm through various channels the veracity of the claims. Some
called acquaintances in Luzhai and others personally visited the polluted site.18
Second, the villagers believed that the relocation of the company to Huaxi
would be unjust and questioned it in the following ways: “If the company harmed
urbanites, won’t it also harm us rural residents?”19 and “If the chemical factory is
not toxic, why does it need to be relocated from Luzhai to Huaxi?”20 Finally,
Wang 王, the surname of most residents in Huaxi village, like the Lu in
Luzhai, was also a prestigious family line. Many villagers worried that their line-
age would be destroyed by the chemical factory.21
The majority of villagers in Huaxi learned about the potential environmental
and health dangers from Dongnong Company through “The portrait.”22 Prior to
the appearance of the leaflet, the villagers’ only complaint was about the low rent
that the company would pay for the use of the land. One villager recalled:
When letters containing “A portrait of Dongnong Company” arrived and copies of “The por-
trait” were posted on village walls, the focus of the villagers’ complaints changed [from the low
rent] to the toxins produced by the company. The leaflet was also distributed in neighbouring
17 Authors’ translation.
18 Interview with a protest leader, 23 June 2007.
19 Ibid.
20 Interview with a villager, 10 June 2007.
21 On lineage as a basis for rural environmental protest, see Jing 2000.
22 Interview with a protest leader, 15 July 2007.
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villages. All of the villagers directed their attention to the issues related to the toxic polluter, and
everyone was very angry.23
One villager stated that “people were emotionally charged at that time, and most
villagers thought ‘The portrait’ made its point.”24
The environmental threat depicted by “The portrait” prompted the villagers to
take action. One villager, who later testified in court, said: “I was so worried. The
leaflet said the company was toxic and it was harmful to our health. I therefore
posted the leaflet on the wall near the front door of my house.”25 Other people
acted collectively. Two villagers, whose houses were closest to the industrial
park, produced 1,000 copies of “The portrait” at their own expense and pasted
them on walls throughout the village. They also had their wives distribute copies
in the market. One villager recalled:
Anyway, we thought that we had started the campaign, so we had to make a big fuss about it.
We had to make sure that every villager in Huaxi knew about it. We hoped that all the villagers
would stick together and prevent the company from establishing a base here.26
Three other villagers started a door-to-door campaign the day after they received
“The portrait.” They circulated “A joint appeal to villagers in Huaxi No. 5 vil-
lage,” which soon gathered more than 600 signatures. The appeal called for a
referendum regarding the relocation. It contended that even if the relocation
plan were approved through a referendum, the company should be required to
sign a document with supplemental terms stipulating its responsibilities to
observe environmental regulations strictly, provide safe drinking water, offer vil-
lagers free medical check-ups, and clean up any pollution on the land after the
expiration of its lease.
Concerned about the safety of their health and crops, villagers seized every
opportunity to question the local officials about whether or not Dongnong
Company produced poisonous waste. Xu 许, the Party secretary of Huaixi
town, repeatedly reassured the petitioners that: “Dongnong Company will
meet all our environmental criteria. Its waste water will be clean enough to
brush one’s teeth with and to cultivate fish, and its waste will be able to be
used to feed our pigs.”27 Despite these promises, he failed to reassure the anxious
villagers. On the evening of 20 October 2001, dozens of villagers went to a restau-
rant where Party Secretary Xu was dining with his associates to demand another
dialogue on the environmental issue. Again, Xu exaggerated the environmental
safety of Dongnong Company, but this time his response infuriated the villagers.
Some villagers shouted, “Drag him to the chemical industrial park! Make him
take a look and smell the waste water!”28 The call was answered: after Xu was
dragged to the industrial park, where thousands of villagers had already
23 No. 287 criminal verdict, Dongyang People’s Court, 2001.
24 Interview with a protest leader, 23 June 2007.
25 No. 287 criminal verdict, Dongyang People’s Court, 2001.
26 Interview with a protest leader, 22 June 2007.
27 Interview with a villager, 29 May 2007.
28 Interview with a protest leader, 15 July 2007.
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assembled, he was forced to walk around the park with bare feet and to smell the
foul waste water from the two factories. After Xu was rescued by a village cadre
and sent to the hospital, the villagers destroyed the fence around Dongnong
Company and smashed the doors and windows of the other two factories.
Some vandalized property and stole computers or telephones. This became
known as the “October 20th Incident,” which marked a high tide but also the
end of the first episode of the Huaxi environmental struggle.
The protest failed to prevent the relocation of Dongnong Company. Worse
still, 12 villagers were prosecuted for disturbing social order and ten were jailed
for between one and three years. The Party secretary of Huaxi No. 5 village,
although not on the scene during the incident, served the longest time behind
bars. As the author of “The portrait,” he was blamed for inciting the “October
20th Incident.”
The events in Huaxi indicate that an effectively framed environmental threat
may motivate Chinese villagers to engage in protest. In this case, “The portrait”
provided Huaxi villagers with information about the impending environmental
threat. It rendered the environmental threat convincing by depicting a real
environmental disaster. Its powerful rhetoric motivated the villagers to take
action and created a sense of injustice among the villagers, and the outrageous
response by the township secretary aggravated this sense of injustice and became
the immediate trigger of a violent riot.
Political Opportunities and the Piggybacking of Issues
The contention in 2001 was a single-issue protest during which villagers con-
cerned about an immediate environmental threat took action to oppose the relo-
cation of a polluting factory. However, environmentally concerned actors do not
necessarily base their protests on purely environmental claims. They may link
environmental problems to other issues so as to apply multiple pressures on
local authorities.29 If they perceive more opportunities from other issues, they
may even adopt a detour strategy, pursuing environmental claims by seeking
redress for other grievances.
The 2001 protest in Huaxi failed to prevent the relocation of Dongnong
Company, but it significantly influenced subsequent protests. First, the harsh
official response to the “October 20th Incident” forestalled further protests for
two and a half years, thereby clearing the way for the relocation of the plant
and a large expansion of the park. It was not until April 2004 that Huaxi villagers
once again attempted to voice their discontent by initiating a year-long collective
petition. However, after failing to address their environmental grievances through
institutional channels, on 24 March 2005, the villagers once again resorted to
29 For issue linkage strategies, see Cai 2010. Issue linkage is also a prominent practice in international
negotiations, since by linking unrelated or loosely-related issues, negotiators may gain extra leverage.
See McGinnis 1986; Sebenius 1983; Stein 1980.
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direct action, blocking the road to the industrial park and maintaining a
round-the-clock vigil for two successive months. Ultimately, they forced 11 of
the polluting factories off the land.
The harsh response to the 2001 incident also forced Huaxi villagers to adopt a
more innovative detour strategy. They pursued environmental claims by seeking
redress for land-related grievances ( jie tudi wenti zuo huanbao wenzhang 借土地
问题做环保文章)30 in order to overcome the obstacles in proving the relationship
between pollution and damage to the environment and health.31
Following the expansion of the park, the environment in Huaxi became
seriously degraded. The park grew to occupy 960 mu (about 64 hectares) of
land and, at its peak, contained 13 factories, mainly producers of chemicals, pes-
ticides, dyes and pharmaceuticals. Nearly all of the factories generated a substan-
tial amount of water and air pollution. According to a deputy head of Huashui
画水 town, pollution caused by the production of weedkillers and defoliators did
the greatest harm to vegetation, causing most plants to die32 and vegetables to
rot.33 An investigation by the local government after the protest indicated that
the pollution from the park had affected about 11,685 mu (about 779 hectares)
of land.34 Worse still, those agricultural products that remained did not sell
owing to fears of poisoning.35 This upset the villagers who had long considered
their hometown as a place of natural beauty. Villagers living off the land suffered
even more as they had not only lost their income from planting cash crops, but
also had to buy in vegetables for their own use from other towns. Consequently,
the price of vegetables surged after the establishment of the industrial park. These
events ultimately presented a real danger to the livelihoods of the villagers.
Huaxi villagers understood the potential adverse health effects of chemical pol-
lution from earlier industrial accidents. Environmental illnesses usually develop
in a chronic fashion. During normal production, victims may have difficulty find-
ing evidence to link their illnesses with the pollution. However, they can immedi-
ately identify adverse health consequences after accidents occur. An “Urgent
report,” submitted to the local government on 12 February 2004, described the
suffering after one industrial accident: “A gust of toxic and fetid gas was suddenly
discharged from the chemical park. The smell was awful. Villagers had difficulty
breathing. Many cried out anxiously: ‘It is hard to bear! Intolerable!’” Another
serious accident occurred on 18 October 2004 when a pipeline at Dongnong
Company ruptured and leaked toxic gas into the air. An activist wrote in his
diary:
There was a foul smell in the entire Huaxi village. The eyes of the villagers began to sting. The
stench was like ammonia and caused the villagers to shed tears continually. Some senior
30 From the record of a meeting held by the Dongyang city government.
31 On this obstacle, see Briggs 2006.
32 Interview with a town leader, 29 June 2007.
33 Hu 2004.
34 Huashui Town Government 2005.
35 Interview with a villager, 27 May 2007; interview with the Huaxi village head, 3 June 2007.
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villagers fainted instantly. A few students on their way to school painfully squatted by the side
of the road [and could not move forward]. Many babies continued crying until they were hoarse
… The scene was too tragic to describe.
The villagers believed that pollution from the industrial park had affected their
health, but they understood that it would be hard to prove the relationship
between pollution and their illnesses. As one villager said, “Who can see the
effects of the pollution on the body?”36 Based on this understanding and the fail-
ure of their protests on purely environmental grounds in 2001, the Huaxi villagers
linked their environmental problems to the issue of illegal land requisitions, since
the chemical park had been built on illegally seized land. As demonstrated by the
22 petition letters that we collected, the Huaxi protest leaders framed their claims
mostly in terms of violations of land-related regulations. This approach, which
we refer to as the piggybacking of contentious issues, although reminiscent of
the issue linkage strategy studied by other scholars,37 is in fact quite different.
The Huaxi villagers essentially made land-related claims, rather than environ-
mental claims, even though their ultimate objective was to oppose environmental
pollution.
The piggybacking of issues is used to take advantage of specific political oppor-
tunities. From 2002 to 2005, political opportunities opened up for both environ-
mental and land-related protests, but to varying degrees. There were two new
opportunities for environmental activists: the passage of the Environmental
Impact Assessment Law on 28 October 2002; and the publicity campaign, called
the “environmental storm” (huanbao fengbao 环保风暴), launched by the State
Environmental Protection Agency to promote enforcement of the new law.
However, in their petitions Huaxi villagers seldom cited environmental regulations
in support of their claims; instead they frequently cited land regulations. According
to the diary written by an activist from 4 August to 14 November 2004, the daily
resistance in Huaxi overwhelmingly focused on the land issue. The protest leader
disclosed that, “We demanded our land back in order to force them to close the
polluting factories.”38 The local authorities understood perfectly well this strategy
of issue piggybacking. During a meeting of township cadres, one official pointed
out: “The villagers, like leeches, are insisting that the local government relocate
the chemical park and return their land.”39 At the same meeting, the director of
the Huashui Land and Resources Station noted:
What the villagers most strongly oppose is the environmental pollution from the chemical park.
Air and water have been polluted. Water is not potable and vegetation cannot grow. The villa-
gers know that the factories cannot stand without the land. Therefore, they altered their strategy
to demand back their land.40
36 Interview with a villager, 27 May 2007.
37 For example, see Cai 2010.
38 Interview with a petitioning activist, 24 May 2007.
39 From the working diary of a Huashui town leader.
40 Ibid.
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Most Huaxi villagers were not opposed to their land being used for industrial
ends, but they were opposed to it being used for the building of polluting fac-
tories. This was further confirmed by a villager who questioned local officials
during the 2005 direct action: “Why did you place toxic factories in our village?
Why didn’t you introduce food factories, processing plants, or furniture compa-
nies here? Didn’t you notice that there were thousands of people living in the
vicinity of the chemical park?”41
Four factors contributed to the formation of this piggybacking strategy during
the Huaxi environmental struggle. First, Chinese environmental regulations are
generally ambiguous and do not effectively address environmental problems. It is
often impossible for victims, not to mention resource-poor farmers, to obtain evi-
dence and establish a causal link between industrial pollution and its adverse con-
sequences. Evenwith a strong case and a good lawyer, victims of pollution still have
no guarantee that they will reach a satisfactory settlement in court.42 Second, many
polluting factories are built on land that has been seized illegally.43 This forms the
basis for the detour strategyof pursuing environmental claims by seeking redress for
land-related grievances. Third, comparedwith the vague environmental laws, land-
related regulations are more straightforward. It is relatively easy for ordinary citi-
zens to prove land abuses by consulting the relevant regulations. That is why the
Huaxi villagers, according to the 22 petition letters that we collected, always
began their complaints by confidently identifying the clauses in the land regulations
that had been violated by the local authorities. Accusations levelled at the polluting
chemical factories were secondary, and in fact some petitions made no mention at
all of the environmental issue.
Finally, owing to the pressures from an increasing number of protests against
illegal land requisitions, the central government was committed to enforcing the
land regulations.44 From 2003 to 2004, the central government issued a series of
land regulations to discipline local governments.45 One such regulation, promul-
gated on 30 December 2003, presented the greatest threat to the survival of the
illegal industrial parks by stipulating that:
All kinds of developmental zones established by county authorities and below should be shut
down. More importantly, to demonstrate its commitment to enforcing the regulation, the cen-
tral government has formulated selective incentives for lower-level governments: if they carry
out self-checking and self-rectification (zicha zijiu 自查自纠), the local authorities will receive
41 Interview with an activist, 15 June 2007. Yu Jianrong, a researcher of contentious politics in China, has
made similar observations. At a 2007 conference, he pointed out that: “Villagers might not be able to file
a lawsuit based on environmental claims, but they might do so by claiming illegal occupation of their
land. We recently noticed a case in a region of Shanxi where villagers did not claim that a factory had
polluted the environment. Instead, they argued that the factory was illegally occupying their land.” See
Yu 2007.
42 For more information on procedural hurdles in tapping legal channels, see Briggs 2006.
43 For example, in Zhejiang 489 of 758 industrial parks or developmental zones had to be shut down,
mostly due to illegal occupation of the land. See Tian 2004.
44 According to Chen Xiwen, director of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, land-related mass inci-
dents accounted for about 50% of the total mass incidents taking place in rural China. See Chang 2007.
45 We collected seven important regulations issued by various ministries of the State Council during the
period from February 2003 to April 2004.
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more lenient treatment. Otherwise, if during the spot checks conducted by the central depart-
ments their violations are exposed, they will be severely punished.46
Most local governments carried out self-checking and self-rectification in order to
avoid punishment.47 They issued notices revoking the licences of the illegal indus-
trial parks within their jurisdictions, but they often had no intention of enforcing
the revocations.48 On 16 April 2004, the Zhejiang provincial government pub-
lished a notice in the Zhejiang Daily concerning the cleaning up and rectification
of the developmental zones. The chemical park in Huaxi was on the list of sites to
be shut down. Forced to follow suit, on 26 July 2004 the Dongyang county gov-
ernment issued 14 similar documents. These documents stipulated that factories
in the Huaxi chemical park should return any illegally seized land to the villagers.
The Huaxi villagers acted mainly in light of these land-related documents.
First, even though they were still subject to repression, the notice published in
the Zhejiang Daily emboldened the villagers to begin a new round of protests.
Second, the villagers urged the local authorities to enforce the regulations. For
example, after obtaining the 14 documents issued by the Dongyang county gov-
ernment, the villagers sent a letter of appeal to the county government and the
Huashui town government. The letter stated that:
According to the decision made by the People’s Government of Zhejiang province to close
Huaxi chemical park, the “Decisions of administrative sanction on illegal land use” issued by
the Dongyang Land and Resources Bureau, and other relevant regulations in the Law of
Land Administration … villagers in Huangshan 黄山 village, Huaxi, will organize to force
the factories to move off our land. If the factories fail to leave, we hope the Dongyang county
government and its relevant departments will urge the factories to return our land.
The head of Huashui town confirmed that the documents issued by the
Dongyang government had provided the Huaxi villagers with a protest weapon.
He noted: “The decision presented a great opportunity for the villagers … They
argued that the government should order the factories to be shut down. They then
would have to move off the land.”49
During the 2005 direct action, protesters in Huaxi formulated an even more
distinctly land-oriented frame of protest. A widely circulated poster read:
“Give back our land, and we want to survive; give back our land, and we
want to be healthy; give back our land, and we want our offspring to prosper;
give back our land, and we want a clean environment.” In this frame, “giving
back our land” served as an indirect method to achieve the goals of keeping
the environment clean and maintaining good physical health.
This strategy contributed to the success of the Huaxi environmental protest.50
The easily identified abuse of the land regulations not only legitimated the Huaxi
46 From a regulation stipulated in the document entitled “The working plan on further managing and rec-
tifying land market order,” issued by the Ministry of Land and Resources on 21 February 2003.
47 Tang 2003.
48 Ibid.
49 Interview with a town leader, 7 June 2007.
50 There were also other important contributing factors, for example the involvement of the Society of
Senior Citizens as a mobilizing structure.
330 The China Quarterly, 214, June 2013, pp. 321–336
villagers’ protest, but also constrained the local government’s use of repression, as
the Party secretary of Huashui town noted in his report:
The chemical park was based on land illegally or semi-legally seized. This offered some of the
masses in Huaxi No. 5 village an excuse to file petitions, and that was also the reason why the
local government could not stand tough during the protest.
Community Relations, Economic Dependency and the Silence of
Contentious Villagers
After the 11 polluting factories were forced out of Huaxi, one might think that
some villagers, especially the protest leaders, would have become converts to
the issue of environmental protection.51 The protest did promote environmental
concern among villagers in Huaxi, as some interviewees have noted: “The masses
now pay more attention to pollution.”52 Several protest leaders even tried to
establish an environmental NGO.53 However, this did not guarantee that the vil-
lagers would take collective action against all environmental problems in the
locality. Local conditions, especially community relations and economic depen-
dency on the polluting enterprises, mediate the translation of environmental con-
cern into environmental action.
When the first author visited Huaxi in April 2007, she found it difficult to
associate the people in this village with the protesters who had fought so fiercely
against chemical pollution and who had won a huge concession from the local
authorities. Many parts of Huaxi were covered with huge piles of plastic waste.
Hundreds of family-run plastic waste recycling workshops dotted the landscape.
These recycling workshops caused great harm to the environment and to the
health of the villagers. Untreated waste water discharged from the workshops
covered the roads, seeping into both the soil and the drinking water supply. In
addition, shrill noises emitted during the plastic shredding process could be
heard throughout the day. There was also a stench from melting plastic and burn-
ing waste. Surprisingly, there had been no serious protests against the pollution
caused by this cottage industry. Some former protest leaders were even participat-
ing in this polluting business. Why were veterans of the earlier environmental
protest movement not taking a stand against the pollution caused by this
industry?
Both the villagers and the local officials knew about the adverse effects of the
pollution caused by the plastic waste recycling. One woman recalled that she had
felt an unbearable itch after one of her feet had accidentally slipped into a ditch
that was full of waste water from a plastic waste processing workshop.54 During a
focus group interview, all of the six participating villagers agreed that the pol-
lution was serious and was causing health problems. One of the most prominent
51 On the impact of popular contention on activists in rural China, see O’Brien and Li 2005.
52 Interview with a protest leader, 15 July 2007; interview with a villager, 29 May 2007.
53 They failed to establish the organization in the end.
54 Interview with a villager, 24 May 2007.
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activists in the Huaxi environmental protest, who was now in the business of plas-
tic waste recycling, admitted that the money he was making could not offset the
environmental damage caused by his business activities.55 Local officials exagger-
ated the severity of the pollution from this cottage business so as to imply that the
Huaxi villagers’ protests against the pollution from the former chemical factories
were unreasonable. For example, the Party secretary of Huashui town commen-
ted sarcastically:
They collect all kinds of waste plastic bags holding chemical products and then clean them;
during this process the waste water seeps into the ground. Believe me. The pollution is several
times more serious than that from the former chemical factories.56
A deputy head of Huashui town strongly agreed with the Party secretary.
Another deputy head of the town mentioned that in Minghuan 明焕, a village
adjacent to Huaxi, almost every household was engaged in this business and
that the village remained enveloped in a foul cloud of smoke. He stated that
the pollution caused by plastic waste processing was far more serious than that
emitted from the former chemical factories.57
Two main factors affected the translation of environmental concern into col-
lective action in Huaxi. One was economic dependency. Plastic waste recycling
had long been a pillar industry in Huashui town.58 The town boasted the lar-
gest market for plastic waste in east China. In 2007, approximately 20,000
people in Huashui lived off this cottage industry, with turnover that year
amounting to over 2.4 billion yuan. More than ten enterprises had a turnover
of ten million yuan, and many more workshops had a turnover of over one
million yuan.59
In contrast, the former chemical park brought nothing but harm to the villa-
gers. There were over 1,000 employees working in the 13 factories before the
2005 protest, yet only around 20 of them came from the villages in Huashui
town.60 Most officials thought that if more local villagers had been employed
by the polluting factories, the protest would have never occurred. They often
referred to the Hengdian 横店 Group61 as an example.62 Officials believed that
the Hengdian Group was able to suppress any protests because most of its
employees were local villagers. Therefore, the Group had ample network
resources to deal with popular resistance. As the former Party secretary of
Huashui town explained: “If anyone within the Group makes trouble, he will
soon be fired. As a result, no one dares to resist. If any village makes trouble,
55 Interview with a protest leader, 31 May 2007.
56 Interview with a town leader, 28 May 2007.
57 Interview with a town leader, 29 June 2007.
58 Most recycling workshops were in Huaxi village.
59 Chen and Jiang 2010.
60 Interview with a town cadre, 20 June 2007
61 The Hengdian Group is a large-scale privately-run business located in Dongyang. It has about 200 sub-
sidiary companies. More than 1,000 corporations are related to the Group in varying degrees.
62 Interview with a police officer, 21 June 2007; interview with a town cadre, 20 June 2007; interview with a
town leader, 17 July 2007.
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the employees from that village will have to return home and engage in thought
reform work.”63 Another township cadre agreed that when local people benefited
from the polluting companies, “things did not get out of hand.”64
The rationale that economic dependency impedes environmental mobilization
holds true in Huaxi. A key activist in the Huaxi environmental protest, who also
considered the pollution from the plastic waste processing industry a serious
threat to the health of the local people, lamented that there were “too many
workshops related to this business”65 and thus it would be impossible to take
action against the pollution it produced. In Minghuan village, nearly every
household was becoming rich from this business. More than 100 families in the
village owned a car, which was (and is) a luxury in the countryside. As a result,
most villagers seemed to be quite satisfied with the status quo. A prominent local
entrepreneur explained: “The pollution is very serious in the village, but the
masses do not have any complaints because they have reaped benefits from the
recycling business.”66
The distinction made by villagers between pollution produced by wairen 外人
(outsiders) and zijiren自己人 (insiders) has had a negative effect on the mobiliz-
ation of anti-pollution protests against the plastic waste recycling cottage indus-
try. Zijiren could be family members, relatives, friends, or others with whom one
has established a special relationship. For rural residents, people from the same
village or the same town are considered to be zijiren and are often treated differ-
ently from wairen.67 During our focus group interview, when the villagers were
asked why they did not take action to address the pollution from the cottage
industry, a former environmental activist answered bluntly: “Those workshops
belong to our fellow villagers.”68 Other interviewees revealed that they did not
take action against their neighbours because they did not want to damage
relations in the neighbourhood.69
However, the history of contention has indeed left a mark and to some extent
has blurred the boundary between pollution produced by wairen and pollution
produced by zijiren. After the 2005 protest, the villagers began to monitor the
two surviving factories that were operated by local entrepreneurs. According to
a report on “Our living environment,” submitted to the Dongyang county gov-
ernment by the Shunda 顺达 Dyeing Corporation on 28 August 2006, it was
63 Interview with a town leader, 17 July 2007. For using social ties to repress protesters, see Deng and
O’Brien forthcoming.
64 Interview with a town cadre, 20 June 2007; also see Gould 1991.
65 Interview with a villager, 19 July 2007.
66 Interview with a local entrepreneur, 18 July 2007.
67 Tilt’s study finds that local residents are especially aggrieved when outsiders (waidiren) run the polluting
enterprises in their community but they bear the brunt of any pollution. See Tilt 2010, 94.
68 Interview with a villager, 27 May 2007.
69 It is worth noting that during the 2005 environmental protest, the two factories in the chemical industrial
park operated by local entrepreneurs were treated much more leniently. In the end, they survived the
protest even as the factories operated by “outsiders” were forced to shut down.
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clear that the factory was very “disturbed” by the villagers’ environmental
oversight:
Since May this year, the Society of Senior Citizens in Huaxi No. 5 village has been sending
members to our company to monitor us. Sometimes it’s two or three villagers; sometimes larger
groups. We once received three delegations in a single day, with one of them consisting of more
than 70 people.
Conclusion
Our study of environmental protest in Huaxi shows that there are complex
reasons for rural environmental protest in China and that pollution and protest
are mediated by social and political contexts. Environmental damage in itself
is an insufficient condition for the occurrence of protest. If citizens perceive a
serious potential threat, they may protest in the absence of actual environmental
damage. If political conditions favour other issues more than the environmental
problems, they may seek to redress their environmental grievances by piggyback-
ing on politically favourable issues. Finally, we have shown that, owing to the
complexities of community relations and economic dependency on polluting
enterprises, villagers may not engage in protest activities, even when they face
actual pollution and health hazards.
The strategy of issue piggybacking has implications for grassroots environ-
mental protest. Protests based solely on environmental claims are often power-
less, but the interlocking of different issues makes it possible for victims to
address environmental grievances by piggybacking on other issues that present
greater political opportunities. The adoption of this strategy reflects both the con-
straints and the resourcefulness of social actors. In spirit, it is consistent with the
strategies of rightful resistance.70 Yet, at the same time, it also reflects the specific
challenges faced by environmental protesters and the ambiguities and contested
nature of environmental claims. Although not a focal point of our analysis, the
difficulty of linking health threats to environmental pollution certainly made
piggybacking land-related claims onto the protests a strategic choice. We
would not be surprised if this strategy were to be used in future protests related
to environment-related health issues.
Our study supports the argument made by some scholars that values are
embedded in people’s social and economic relations.71 The implication of our
findings is that the chances of environmental protest are contingent upon these
other conditions and values. It means that the politics of environmental protest
aimed at addressing rural environmental grievances must go beyond environ-
mental pollution concerns to encompass broader issues such as socio-economic
inequality, rural–urban imbalances, community values and social relations, as
well as accountable governance.
70 O’Brien and Li 2006.
71 Tilt 2010; Lora-Wainwright 2010; Bauer 2006.
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